JULY 2003 EDITORIAL

Chemical weapons have been universally condemned by world leaders throughout the past century, yet the inadequacies of the 1925 Geneva Protocol still leave a lasting legacy.

Under the Protocol, signatory nations reserved the right to use chemical weapons in certain situations. Furthermore, the Protocol did not ban the manufacturing and stockpiling of chemical weapons, so arsenals continued to grow to ridiculous levels: the US has admitted to harbouring 29 million kg of chemical agents, only to be outdone by the former Soviet Union’s 36 million kg.

Australia was a key player in diplomatic efforts to control weapons of mass destruction. At first it had been hoped that controls on both chemical and biological weapons could be developed simultaneously, but in the end separate conventions were signed two decades apart.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was eventually ratified on 29 April 1997, and has now been approved by 165 countries. It gave signatory nations 10 years to eliminate stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Now, with less than 4 years to go, Stanley Sandler warns that both the US and Russia are unlikely to meet this deadline (see p.24). Sandler has served on committees studying methods to destroy the US stockpile. While agreed international protocols specify the methods of disposal, putting them into practice has proven more difficult. The “not in my backyard” view has prevailed, and civic and environmental groups have joined with local governments to stall proceedings.

Failure to achieve the CWC deadline would be yet another blight for the US given its failure so far to locate the weapons of mass destruction it used as the basis for its war against Iraq. Former chief United Nations weapons inspector, Richard Butler, says the US and UK are “the proud owners of massive quantities of those weapons”, and these “double standards produce a situation that is inherently unstable” (AS, Nov/Dec 2002, pp.40-41).

Likewise it is hypocritical for the US and its allies to turn on a mostly defenceless Iraq while turning a blind eye to North Korea’s nuclear program. With North Korea reliant on US aid to keep its economy from collapse, it stands to reason that its uranium enrichment program - and the temptation to sell to the highest bidder - poses a greater international security threat should the US and North Korea fall out with each other.

It is disappointing that Australia’s leadership in the development of the CWC has been subjugated to present US foreign policy. If our government is sincere in its rhetoric about national security it must re-establish independent foreign policy that does not rely on self-serving US intelligence.

Guy Nolch
Editor